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As to the rrecise relation existing between the
directors of a corporation and the coryoration itself
authorities would seem at first glance to be
fusion.

-

the

great con-

They hold in varying degrees all the way from the

common law idea that directors are agents of the corporation
in

its

character as an artificial

ideal entity, to the equi-

table theory that they are trustees of the corloration regarded as an aggre-ation of individuals.

Thus a Conn. Court

sIYs -lainly that they arecgents and liable only to their
rrinciral, the corroration, for their acts.
Horton C.

J.

of Kansas

says that they are

(26 Conn., 445)
agents of

p:r1.ary

the corporation, and in reference to the corporation property
acts in the relation .f trustees.

(21 Kas., 3G5).

prevailing doctrine undoubtedly is that the
trustees of

the corporation.

But the

directors are

In Robinson vs. Smith,(3 Paige
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Ch., 222) it was held that the directors were jersoxally lLable as trustees, for loss occasioned by their fraud or negltZgence.

The 7 izllsh rule is stated in one place as follows.

'He (the Iirector) is in ioint of fact, not merely a director,
but he also fills the character of trustee for the shareholder,
and he is, in regard to all matters entered into in their
behalf, to bc treated as an agent; therefore, there attaches
to the director for the benefit of the shareholders, all the
li.bilities and duties which attach to a trustee or agent.
Accordingly, if a director enters

into a contract for the

comprany, he cannot derive any benefit from it."
586)

In Law Rej.,

('25 Bcav.,

0 Ch.Div., 322, it is said "They are the

managing partners of- the comrany, and if they abuse their powers,

which they hold in trust for the c)-n:any, to the dam-

age of the company, for their own benefit, they are liable to
make good the breach

of trust to their cesttis que trustent

like any other trustee.,-'

rout TMr.

Miorawetz in Vol. I.,

sec. 516, says "It Is clear that the directors or managing
agents of a corporation are not trustees in a technical sense,
although they are often called trustees in practice;

they

are merely agents, invested -ith wide discretionary powers in
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the management of the company's business.

The relation be-

tween the directors of a corporation arnd the company itself,
is, however, in many respects a fiduciary or trust

elation.

Whenever an agent is vested. with authority to use any discreticn in the use of the powers conferr d upon him, it is an
implied condition that this discretion shall be used in good
faith for the benefit of the :rincipai, and in accordance
with the true purpose of the agent's appointment.

To this

extent, every agency which is not a purely ministerial one
involves a fiduciary relation between the parties."
Pomeroy in 3 Po.

Eq.Jur.,

Prof.

sec. 1089, -ives what seems to be

a very terse and accurate stateient of this relation,in
ST

these wor,'s:-

'The directors and supreme managing offices of

corporations are constantly spoken of as trustees.

They

are not, however, true trustees with the corporation or the
stockholders as their cestui que trustent, since they hold
neither t.e legal title to the corporate pro:-erty nor that to
the stock..

in fact directors are clothed -t the same time

with a double capacity, that of quasi tf'ustecs and that of
agents.

It is of the utmost inpyortance to discriminate ex-

actly between these two characters, and to determine accurate-
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ly,

for whom,

over what subject matter ai-d to what extent

they are thus trustees;

for 11:uonr

this trust relation primar-

ily delend the equitable remedVa5which mn,'

be obtained against

them by the corporation or by the stockholders.
function af agency are derived their
corporation as a legal entity;
powers in

it

From thei

overs to act for the

measures the extent of thee

the :nanagement of both the external and internaal

affairs; it fixes the rights and obligations of the corporation in dealings with stockholders and with third rersons.
The rights, duties, liabilities and remedies which results
from the directors agency are therefore legal;the equitabLe
rights,

'u ies and remedlies are mainly referable to the

the trust element of the director's functions."
wood of Penn. says in

Sperin-i's Apr.,

71 Penn.;t.,

Judge Shars11,

"It

is by no means a well settled joint what is the precise relation which directors sustain to stockhold.e-s.
undoubtedly said by many authorities
that as I ar~rehend,

is

oniY in

They are

to be trustees, but

a general sense,

as we term

an agent or any bailee entrusted with the care and management of the ,ror erty of another.
are not technical trustees.

It is certain that they

They can only be regarded as

nmandator

:,s -- p rsons who have

perform certiin duties,

-ratuitously undertahing to

and who are,

there-fore,

bound to ap-

ply ordinary shill and diligence,and no more."

He goes on

to say that zince they are themselves stoclholders,

the pre-

sumption is that, interester
as they are in the success of
the business, they will bring their best judgment and skill to
bear upon the duties of their office.

Further, that since

they are asked by the stockho'ders to thus serve without
compeneation, they should not be so strictly judged as should
an agent or trustee of a lrivate estate, and that for mere
mistakes of judgieut they should not be responsible,
vided the mistahes

pro-

;ere honest and fairly within the scope

of the powers and discretion confided t: the managing body,
even th:ugh they were so gross as to appear to others absurd
and rediculous.

13ut Jud-e Earl in Hun vs.

Cary,

82 N.Y.,

65,

Probably voices the consensus of authorities when he says,
regarding Judgc Sharswood's opinion just given,
stand this language,

"As I under-

I cannot assent as properly defining to

any extent the nature of a firector's res-onsibility.
a mandoatory,

to which he has been likoned,

only to exercise proper ca.e

and diliZonce,

he is

Like

bound not

but ordinary skill
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and judgment.

As he is bound to exorcise ordinary skill and

jud7mmnt he cannot set up that he did not possess them.
When damage is

caused by -is want of judgment, he cannot ex-

cuse himself by alleging 'is

gross i-norance.

One who vol-

untarily takes the -osition Df director, and invites confidence in that relation, undort,-tes, like a mandatory, with
those who he represents or for whom he acts, that he possesses
at least ordinary :nowledge and skill, and that he will bring
them to bear in the fischarge of his duties.
Bailments, sec. 182a)."

(Story on

In Hun vs. Cary, which was @n ac-

tion brou-ht by a receiver of a savings bank against the
trustees, for alleged reckless extravagance in the use of
the funds, it was held that the relation between the savings6,1
and its trustees or directors is that of principal and agent
and that between the trustees and depositors is similar to
that of trustee and cestui que trust.
In regard to t"
rectors arJd shareholders,
but the yrevai-in-

relAtlon cexisting between the didifferenut opinions are rel-orted,

'!ctrine is

-robably that the directors

a-e trustees for all the shareholders.

Their fiduciary re-

lation is limited to cases in which the action of the directors
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has affected the whole body of the shareholders; and when
only shareholder was affected, there was held to be no trust
relation between the parties. (15 Am.Rep., 245)

Shaw C.J.

in 12 Metc. , 371, says:- "There is no legal -rivity, relation, or irnnediate connection, between the holders of shares
in a bank, in their individual cala-ity, on the one side, and
the directors or the other.

The directors are not the bOLl-

ees, factors, agents or trustees of such individual stockholders."

Robertson J. of the

I.Y.Sup.Ct.,

(10 Bosw., 391)

describes the relation of directors to sh reholders as resembling a bailment.
lie says:- "There -May be a confidential
betveen
relation subsisting a stockholder and a director, creating
a certain duty by the latter to the former, or certain rights
in the former which give the former a right to prevent, or
sue for, the malfeasance of the latter.

But I think it will

be found that neither'trustee'not'agent'

expreeses such re-

lation, and that bailee of the capital of the corporation to
pdform specific duties therewith comes :.uch more near to it."
He also holds that in order to sue the directors for damage
done by their acts,

a stock'holdcr may not sue alone bift must

make the corporation a aty to the action.

Equity, however,

-ahas modified this
call

rule so that

ii

the cxroratiDn Will

fraudulently or neg-

who have either

to account officers

not

ligently exceeded their authority or if the corporation

is

under the control of those sought to be made rarties defendant
the etocdholdors who are te real rarties
a bill

in

fendant;
selves

own nanes >ahing the corporation a rarty

their

or a 1art

case it

of them may file

others staniing in

and all

venience requires
this

i-Cterest may file

in

it(

(Peabody

v.8 hold

the cor'oration

a bill
t

e same relation,

that the directo-s

and that t

i", behalf of them-

7'lint,

vs.

coro-ation
cre

de-

G Allen,

if

con-

50)

In

are trustees
is

itself

for
a trustee

for the stockL.olders.
Upon a careful exazaination of all the authorities
uron this
to bd in

subject,
conflict,

it

vill

be found that althou-1h they seem

they all

have one thing in

comuon.

can be no doubt that the directors of a corporation act
fiduciary

cayacity,

or that their

those of fiduciaries.

-.uties

and liabilities

There is no disagreement

There
in

a

are

as to the

measure of their duties and liabilities, or as to the standard
by which their liability

is measured.

The

-nly difference is

as to who stand in such relation to them as to be able to en-
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force such liobillty.
speai "an,

the o-0:7

It is
Iiret .

-rou-bly true that, strictly

ivity is

bctw:eCn the directors,
entity,

and the corroration as an crtificial

and that the

dircctors are trustees for the cor-oration only.
not be questionei,
shareo.ler
trust,

Lut it

can

in the light of the authorities that the

'71ve such interest

that they may in

in the enforcement

of the

certain cases bring suit for that pur-

pose directly against delinquent directors.
Coming nov. to the relat-on between direcior

and

creditors, we find the rules heretofore stated not always applicable.

To the extent of croditor's interests, corporate

funds are held in t-ust for creditors as well as for shareholders.

Consequently,

directors -aving in their charge

funds on which creditors have valid claims and equitable
liens, but in
ly no voice,

the management o!-

Thich creditors have ordinarL-

occupy a position of trust towards the creditors

as well as toviardhs the siareholders;

and owe it

to creditors

to protect their interests, as they owd it to shareholders to
protect the interests of the latter.
creditors iuof

The only claim of

course, to be paid the amount due them, and

their main right A

that the corporate funds shall not be
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recklessly mism-magod,

or diverted from their true purpose.

And directors naturally owe it
roration solvent,
regular business.

to creditors to heei the cor-

anhC to u-e the funds in furtherance of the
And, accordingly, directors will be liable

to the :ersons for whom they hIold corporate finds in
in vwhich

,uyfber creditors are included,

fraud or neglig.ence comit a breace
them.-

if

trust,

they either by

of the trust confided to

In the absonce of gross fault or negligence, however,

they are liable only to the exteit of the capital stock and
corrorate assets.

In considering the b-owers of' directors, we find
three zenrA:l rules laid coy,
strictly speahing,

for their -overrLment, or more

one gener 1 rule and two limitations there-

on.
The first rule as to the ext nt of the Iovira
ferred

con-

by "authority to manage the business of the corpor-

ation" is that such povwer extends to the doing of any ordinary
act conducive to the succeos

or deuaned by the exigencies

of the business; and since any :Lerson acting in a fiduciary
capacity must necessarily exercise an honest discretion and
under certain circumsta-ces may do acts which at other times
would be in violation of his trust, so directors,may, in critical emergencies do acts which would be unauthorized under
ordinary circmmst a1ces.
The second ruse is

that aut-_crity to manage the
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affairs of a corporat~on does not authorize the directors to
change the scheme of the corp:rate enterprise or the nature
authorize them to

of the corporate busincss; nor does it

bring the business to a conclusion either directly, or indirectly thought acts which would render t-ie continuation
of the business as planned impossible.
The third rule is that since the constitution and
ail auth:rity thereby confcrre., relate to a specific enterprise and corporate purpose, no authority is conferred on
directors to bin.
no connection

the corporation in

regard to matters having

with the objects of incorporation.

Turning back to the first rule the question at once
arises--ilow is the score of the term ordinary act within the
corporate powers to be determined?

It would hardly be

limited to routine -r clerical or ministerial business, but
would seem to have a more comprehensive meaning,
J.

of' New York Court of Appcals,

dinary busine~ss

in

Comstock

construing the term"or-

which a by-lhn empowe-ed a quorum composed

of less than a majority of directors to transact said in
19 :.Y., 206-17:-had,

I think,

"The oriinary business of the corporation

no limit short of the varied and extensive af-
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fairs in

7as author ized by its

which it

charter to engage.

It could construct and op6rate a canal, deal in stocks and
trusts,

and it

could cayry on the businerss of bankinzg in

all

If the due execution of these powers aid

its de~artmcnts.

not constitute the ordinary business of the company then it
seems to ue irzMossible to suggest any definition of the term,
and the by-law becomes senseless and unrmeaningless, and if
these express powers of the corporation were embraced in the
terms of the by-law, it must necessarily follow that the
quorum designated took all the incident-.l authority which
the whole board .:ould poseess in the execution of the same
powers.

In the operation of banhing, which constituted one

pDrtion of the ordinary business it night become necessary
to borrow money, and the power to do so existed.

As debts

could be contracted the incidental power of raying them can
not be do-ibted,

go,

the condition of the company's affairs

might requir a negotiation with creditors, and the postponment
To secure a debt, and procure

and securing of their demands.
its forbearance in

a period. of embarassment, would not by any

means be an extraordinary
although it

act,

might be unusual in

in

the sense of the by-law,

the magnitude and importance
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of the transaction.,"
Accordingly all business in furtherance of the corpc--ate enterprise and not involving any departure therefrom,
may be transacted by the directors.

They have full auth-

o rityuniless restrained by the charter or by-laws to do any-

thing the corporation may do.

In fact the board of directors

is frequently tdrmed the corporation, and in te case of
savings banks, for instance, this designation would seem to
be entirely -proper.

ITUnder the second general rule that

JP

directors cannot change the scheme of the corporate enterprise
nor bring the business to a conclusion there are four things
directors cannot do.
First:-

they cannot change the nature or plan of the

corporate business,

nor in

the absence of special authority

can they accept from the legislature any radical alteration
or amendment in the corporate constitution.

But a statute

facilitating the exercise of franchises already enjoyed is
not view~in the light of a substantial change in the constitut ion.
Second:- directors may not increase or decrease the
capital stock of the corporation.

Justice Bradley in 18
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in

says,

Wall. , 233-4,

and fundamental

coni-ection:-' "A change

this

stock of a

the calitai

av that of incr,,a7irn-

corporation beyond the limits fixed by the uharter
directors alone,

made by t.e

cannot be

authorized so to

to Terform all corporate acts refers

The general 1oer

do.

unless expressly

so organic

to the ordinary business

of the corporation,

transactions

ard

does not extend' to a reconstruction of the body itself, as
to a:: enlargement
rest

of course,

of its

stock."

These

with the shareholders.

entirely

Third:-

capital

dircctor-s

cannot

corporate property

t-ansfer

which is

necessary to the continuance of the corporate

ness.

Such a
But if

holders'.

sale is

void as against non-assenting

the stockZholders

a.ke no

will

be taken as assenting.

directors
funds,

But it

for which it

of D-.y
w

stock-

are silent

acquiescence

they

546)

So the

Penn.St.,

to give away its

of the nc -ns of accomplishing

chartered.

(43 Pa. St.,

the

29, 37)

has been held that directors have rower to apply 1500

pounds out of the w'
pany,

(103

Df a corToraticn have no -,!ov e'

or deirive it

purroses

by their

objection whatevc,

and

having -otice,

busi-

as a gratuity

ivided :rofits

of a manufacturing com-

of one week's extra p .y to each employee
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who had worked with a good character throughout
(4E L.J.Eq.,

This doctrine has,

437)

however,

the year.
not met with

favor in the United States.
Fourth:-

if

7irectors hve no power to sell cor-

porate -roiperty u,hich is
business,

they

essential to the continuance of' the

certainly have no right to vini up the

affairs of the corporation,

such right residing solely in the
But it

body of the share-holders.

directors acting in -ood fait
x" LD-

has been held that the

have the rie
hv

sigrnent for the benofit of creditcrc,

he

n-t to make an as-

not only wothout ask-

ing permission of the shareholdors but against their expressed
17i 1.

(91 11o. , -10) (01 :,o. , 1307)
The last of the three general rules herein before

menitioned is that the r.irctors have no authority to bind
the co)rporation in
business.
evident.

rfatte-'s riot relating to the corporate

On the face of it this u:ould seer

to be self-

The powers enjoyed by the 'Lireotors whether con-

ferred by the constitution on by a vote of the shareholders,
have their ultimate basis in the corporate constitution, and
in the agreement embodie9

therein.

Therefore the diredtors

have no power to do any act outside the limits authorized by
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the charter or by-lawzs, and since t'me charter and agreement
relate

only to the corporate enterprise

aw y acts having no re-

lation to the corrorate enterprise must be beyond the authority of the directors.

AccordIingly the directors have no

authority to give the note of the corporation for a debt
having no relation
note;

to

its

business,

due to tho payee of the

and such a note will be void in the hands of' persons

having notice of the circim-stanccs

under whi-h it

But, on the other hand, if the direltors acting
arparent

scope of their

authority,

commit

was giving.
-.
ithin the

a breach of their

trust, the rights of an innocent -person dealing with them
will

Thus,

not be affected thereby.

due authority,

if

directorc , having

borrow money for the corporalion

the lender

is not bound to sec that the money is used for the furtherance of the company's business and not used for purposes ultra
viresthe corporation or embezzled by the directors.
wlly. Rcp.,

(20

254)
Acts of directors relative

have no authority may be null
the stoohh
nolders

although if

to matters

and void at

which they

the discretion

the acts are -ot

law they may subscquently be ratifie1

in

of

contrary to

by the stockholders

and
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take effect ffnm the date of ratification.

be either expres-

Ratification may

or imlied, and in r;eeral the evidence

thereof _must be of as high a nature as would have been required to show 7,rior authority.

And mIroreover any delay on

the part of the principal in repudiating the acts of his
agent,

by which the latter haq ovorste-red

makes the acts his own.

(69 Pa.1St.,

426

his authority,
cases cited)

As to what -ortion of their authority directors may delegate
to some of their own nunnber or to other officers,

7o

more

definite rule can be given than that they ca,7ot delegate
authority wich it was intended that they as a bourd should
exercise.

Thus while they cannot delegate authority to do

acts involving per-onal skill and discretion, still they may
delegate authority to do merely ministerial acts.

This, to ,E

sure, is rather an exercise J ian a delegation of their authority since it is not intended that lirectors should :-erform
the duties of subordinate of icor.

They may, of course,

regulate the authority of those xc.om they appoint, and thus

they may authorize the president, or president and cashier,
or the general agent, to borrow money and draw and endorse
negotiable paper in the name of the corporation: (12 S.& R.,
256) or may authorize a treasurer to sign mortg-ages belonging
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to the coryoration.

( 137 Mass.,

wider dipcretio2i than mayv saf(!iy be cntru
fieer may be 6Thiojatc(

1:, director

'1~Ler
the boCarrl, of (~il

. Y.,

C207,

a

2.

:f tuo:t'-th
io
'e

'elegate c.2.ori~'. to a.
ness.

'Nlc-U,

to

tec to a sin-le of-

to a eoui'1itt-e of their

be v%
f

c(.'C
'nc

involving a

Pfrs

41)

3

ircr Ior s
.ct

Ar in
:;-

L~

aiove- 1o

all ordinary busi-

They may delegate -authority to a comittee of their

ovrn niuaber to alienate or riortgage real estate,

or may author.

ize one of their number to sign any securities belonging to
the company.

And on the other hand there are decisions hold-

ing that directors cannot delegate their authority. to allot
sharesto make calls, to declare dividends, or to order a
sale of shares for the non-payrnent

of assessments.

r De

facto officers are those whose acts although not those of
lawful officers,

the law,

upon p-rinciywes of policy and jus-

tice, will hold valid as regards the interests of the public
and third pa'ties, where the duties of the office were exercised: First without a known appointment or election,
but under such circiunstances of reputation or acquiescence
as would lead persons to de.l with them sulposing them to be
regularly elected officers.
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undor color of a re.,ular election ,'_r appoint

Second,

ment, but where the officers had failed to conform with some
requirment

or condition -frecedent, such as taking an oath

or filing - bond.
Third,

under color or an election 7:1-ich woa

cause of the officer not being eligible,
a

t

of .-o.-er in

irreoularity

in

its

void be-

or on account of

the electing bo -- _, or by reason of some
exercise,

the defect,

of whatever nature.

being unknown to the publi.
..rt,

made in
same is

unde- color of an election or a?::ointment
ur'._suencc of an unconstitutional i-a. , before the
adjudged to be such.
A de jure off icc)r i

to an office,

(38 Conn.,

449)

one w-ho has the lawful right

even though hAe may have been ousted from it

has nevcr actually t kea

possession of it.

or

An officer do

facto must be actually in posses'sion of the office and have
it

under his control,

And it

folozs that two ::,_r-sons can-

not be de facto officer for the sascne office at the same time.
The contracts of de facto of ric-er
'ting
7
wi'hin the srhere
A direcof their office, are bi 'ding uiron the corroration.
tor do facto cannot

avoid a Iiability by settin,-

'mT that he
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was not a do jure director,

(2 Raile, 139); nor collect a

salary as a do facto officer.

(7

S.&.

R.,

38)

He miay be

ousted only by a quo warranto 71oceeding and not by a suit
in

equity nor by an action iin tresI:aass.

Director-) of a cor-oratimi, may b-' a brecch of
their official duties become personally liiable to the corporation or its representatives, or to a part or all of the
stockholders, or to third persons ur creditors havinl dealings
with the company.

This liability me y arise uder an express

statute or it may exist independently of any statute.
the former case, the statute defines t
out the manner of enforcing it.

in

liabi -ity and points

In the latter case, the

question as to when this liability ariFcos

n' who may en-

force it, and the maner in zhich it is to be c.forced can
only be solved by a clear conccrtion of the relations existing between the directlrs and the corporation, shareholders
and creditors.

in the orenlg. chater the status of directors

with regard to all of these was briefly outlined, and it was
found that they have a two-fold character, that of agents and

trustees .

It

briefly this: For -ion-feacance,
duties of his agency,

he is

some one claiming trouh
or wrongs done in the

of an agent,

th-t the liabilty

r-n

is

or for non-execution of the

liable only to his j-,. ifiipal or
Tor
oriicii.
misfeasance

his

course of his agency,

or witqout the score of his authDrity, he is

whether within
liable to the per-

son 4ured, whether such person be his :,rincipal or a stranger.
It

is plain that the company itself has a remedy against its

directors for negligence, fraud, breaches of trust, or acts
dont

in excess of their authority,

either at law or in equity,

according to the nature of the wrong done.
fraud or misfeasance,

done by directors,

For acts of

vwhe-eby shareholders

are injured, the latter have an action at law, on -recisely
the same grounds as othc_r strangers 7onld have.

Shareholders

also have a remedy against directors for breaches of trust
committed by the latter where the corporation refuses to pursue for the shareholder,

the prove.

remedy.

Etranger have

any appropriate r(medy against the directors of the corporatiol which one man may ordinarily have against another in
the ordinary relations ol civil society, not resting in contract.

In cases arising from wrongful acts,

each is liable
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for all the consequences.

There is

no contribution between

them, and it is unnecepsary, thercfore, to mahe all the directors parties defendant, vhether tley have joined in the
wrongful act or nat.
princi:

Following the rule sf agency that a

L and agent --ay be jointly ii :ble for acts of mis-

feasance committet- b'y the agent in the course of the business
of his agency,

it has been held that a corporation and its

directors may be liable in equity a-d rossiaiV at la -,, for a
wrongful act of the directors.
ex-contractu:

But it would be an action

an action at law will not lie -'S2.Inst

ation for deceit.

Directors are not

liable for the

a corporfrauds

of subordinate officers aUyycolnted by them unless they authorized the wrong or in some 1,:y shared in it,

since the agents

alth:ulh arpointed by the directors are agents of the corporation,a.and the doctrine of resr

ndeat

sucrior

to the corporation than to the directors.
diate agent has bc

if the interme-

Zuilty of neglitrence in -Cf:-ointing unfit

subordinate agents, he is liable
the breach of duty.

a:: lies rather

.ly

6o hi.s principal for

Directors, however, may under certain

circumstances beco-e liable

for the frauds of their agents,

even though they r"id not 'now of thecm at the time they were

comuitted.

This vrili

h-iaon

thc

-h--Ae
i?-ctors
o

and knowingly derived a bonefit from the fraud.
slibordinate

a-ents

sense the agents of t
The

Here the

vho co->J-itte( the fraud become in

a

e directors.

-eneral hoic

to the corroration is

,er-sonally

to

iich

refer-c-:d is

the liability

of directors

that of b-reach of trust.

This brebc- may consist of:-I.

Fraud or mal-

II.

Of neg-igencc or non-feasance,

2

eoasance,

III. Of acts ultra vires.
In examining into the fraud of directors,

we find

one rcrinciple underlying all their acts: viz, that the
directors of a corporation sustain towar-f
relation of trusteos arnn

its members the

cestuis que trustents, and in every

transaction in their capacity as directors the utmost good
faith is e'sevItial.

'Te have seen t'.at for me-e mistakes of

judgient they are not necess?.rily liable, but for all frauds
they are held strictly to 3ount.

One of the most fo-iliar

doctrines of equity is that a trustee will under no eircumstances be permitted, without the Uriorlodge or consent of his
pri-ciTal to sycculate ot of his t-rust or to retain any profit

-2(3that

may have

account

accrued to him Tersonally,

to his cestui

made out of the trust

que trust

for all

relation.

but he must
profits he may have

r-,iS rule awil

force to directors of corporations. (58 Pa.St.,

vrith full
120)

It

does not nceoss arily mon that they arc precludod from making
any profit -vhatever ut of their trust relation, but that they
muist inae ,.o secret
-rofit out of it.
The body of the

corporation may, after learning all the circtunstances, allow
them to make a p-rofit
transaction

is

.),t

of the t-ansaction,

comrlcteC,

m y ratify

or after

the

any acts dcne by them

and will thereafter be estopped from repudiating such acts.
A cormon forn of uahin'

secret

in one form or another.
may derive benefit from

is

to receive a bribe

Thus the directors of a rail-road
causin

town or section of the country.
they -are t men trustees in
whether

-,_-fits

it

to run through a certain
It is

a quection wnvethor

of thu fund t us
iq'ityreceive

they are guilty of a breach of their

has been held' (in

0 Pa.St.,

202) that

proceed a ainst them either at 1w:: or

trust,

the cororation
in

but

or
it

may

equity for the breach

of the trust.
Another form of fraud practiced by directors is
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seen in c-onstruction compa-ies,

it sometimes happens that

a director of a rail-road cormi-::y is

are -_ore than

and he, :r they if t er

construction coi-.a may
one of them,

a director in a R.R.

so manage the rail-road' s affairvc

construction conrnyany

is

av:arfled the ccntract
It

the road or rortions of it.

is

that the

for builing

c iear that one man cannot

servo tvio masters rhose interests a-re conflicting,
of equity usually pronounce
Then,

too,

versa,

such contracts

sales by the directors

are voidable

at

the oytion of the stochh:olcrs al-

nothing to yrevent sale- of tVis h.ind,

particular
ties.
rurity

291)

There is

articulariy where the

rt'l resented by an-other agent wine transacts this

business anc! where
But the burden is
of their

or invalid.

illegal

to thIe corporatioii or vice

though not necessarily void. (60 Pa.SCt.,

corroration is

and courts

sood faith

governs both par-

always on t-Le directors to show the

intentions.

So where directors vote themselves

salaries,

or an

increase over those sjlaries allowcd then by the shareholders,
a court

of equity will

tiers.

Althoug"'

rirc,.tors

sation to one of their

interfo'e in behalf of the shDIrehoi.f
:.iimber

a

o.

voting- ext"a eomrer-

for extr-'a services as agent of

-28-

the bank,

are not liable thereforo if

th(-.y act in good faith

and for the benefit of the corporation,
co"irensation is

althoigh t-e extra

illegal and --ay be recovered back by the

company from the director receiving it.

(ii

Ala.,

191)

There are some other acts which are voidable
but not absolutoly void, the burden being alyt, cys on the
directors to show the fairness of the transactions.
are contra-ts between corpor.tions having directors in
Also

Such
common.

in the cases of directors purchasing pr:perty for

the corporation or buying uir corporate debts.
guilty of sIeculating with corporate funds,

But directors

or of cancelling

subscriptions of particular directors or shareholders, or
allotting shares to infant children are hold por sonally liable to the corporation.
With res- ect to the liibility

for negligence of the

directors to the corporation we must recur for the solution
of any problems v.hich may arise to the doctrine governing the
liability of agents and mandatories.

This doctrine has been

framed into two rules which are generally acceptcd as authority.

They are:-- lst.,

discretion,

"Vhere directors are clothed 'ith a

they are not responsible to the corporation for
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damages flowing from an exorcise of this discretion, however,
erroneous their exercise of it
2nd.,

in

respect t5 their

may have been.
:inistorial duties,

they are

not responsible to the corporation for anything short of
gross negligence, non-attendance and freuci,
have been perpetrated,

whereby frauds

or thie property of the corporation

emblezzled or wasted.
The d irectors of boanks from the nature of their
undertaking fall

within the class of cases where only ordin-

ary care and diligence are required.

It is not expected that

they should devote their vfhole time and attention to the institution in which they are acting, but other officers who
are duly compensated therefor,

have t-ie immediate management.

They are, of course, un'er the control of the directors and
the doree of care necessary to be observed by the directors
is

controlled by circumstances or custom.

if there have

been no acts by the President or Cashier calculated1 to awaken
suspicion as to their fidelity,
is

sufficient.

But if

ordin!7ry care and diligence

the directors become acauainted with

any fact calculated to put prudent men on their guard, a
degree of care commensurate with the evil to be avoided is

-30-

and a want of that care would certainly render them

required,
liable.

In considoring directors'

Ultra Vires Acts.

liability upon contractual engagements, the fundamental
princilloa of agency a-1ly.

Thus it is laid down in the text

books that a rerson who entcrs into a cm;ntract as agent for
a disclosed T--

and responsible

,

-,rincipal, and within
Further that

his powors, is not liable urpon such contract.
if

such person contracting as agent exceeds his powers,

princiral
is

if

is

not bound,

while he himself is

liable,

wlom he is

both act and give the parties with

dealing to ,ndcrsta-,d

that

1-ieis

acting as agent,

and is unwilling to incur any T ersonal liability.
he will be hold as a
intention.

as he also

lie must

in reality he has no existing Iprinciral.

clearly and unistakably

tho

Otherwise

rrincipal oven though ho had no such

If he has ho rrincipal at the time and there is

not then in existence any person who could be -riyici-al, then,
as the contract would otherwise be wholly inoperative,
person will be held to have acted in his

such

j oalf and he

; n

e-rl)

cannot afterwards be kelieved from liability

by the intpntion

of some person villing to ratify such contract.
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So an agent of a corporation is liable where he
either expressly or imrnliefiy by his conduct misrepresents
the extent of his authority.

This last is probably'the com-

monest instance where a -erson dealing with directors obtains
regress from them personally on the ground of the contract
being ultra vircs either of themselves or of the corporation.
The principle is as follows:-- "If a director or other off icial of a corporation -aking a contract with a person misrepresents 'is own authority, whereby a contr-act not enforcible
against the corporation is made, and the

.erson so contracting

was niot aware of the limitation of authority, such person will
have a-" action for damages against the individual guilty of
the misrepresentation;

and it has been decidec

that he will

have a similar action when the misrepresentation is of the
powers of the corporation;" the accuracy of this last clause

has, however, ben 7uestione,.

Thus in Cherry vs. Bar!',

L.R.,3 P.C., 24, two of the directors of a company informed
a bank that they had aprointed "C" to be manager of the comThey had no
pany, and had authorized him to draw checks.
v:ere
authority so to do, but they held upon chechs drawn by "C"
upon the imylied warralty that they had the requisite author-

'2 '

ity.

An agent will not be liable if the person with whom he

dealt knew or had the means of knowing that ho had exceeded
his authority.

As to those matters wherein the powers,

either of the corporation or of the agent are fixed by public
act or by generkl laws, parties doeling with the agent have
the means of knowing and must be yrestmed to know the extent
of the power;

and having thus constructive notice, cannot set

up that they were deceived by any implied representations or
warranty of rci:er in the corporatio- or of authority in
agent.

the

The mere fact that a director or other official

enters into a transaction in such capacity is no representation or v:waranty of his ovrn or of the corporate powers, or
that the corporation will carry out such transaction.
If the directors of a corporation do an act which
is clearly beyond the powers conferred upon them by the
charter or incorporating statute, and whereby lossess are sustained by the company a court of equity will, in

a

proper

proceeding compel them to makc good such loss out of their
private estate.

A provision in the charter of a bank, pro-

hibiting any director or other of-icer under a penalty of fine
or imprisonment, from borrowing any -rioney from t'e ba-r2

does

not release a director from liability to the bank for the
money thus loaned him.

Such contract, though illegal, will

be enforced because its enforcement is not contrary to p.ublic
policy. but in conformity wit. it.
If direotors hnowingly issue illeg;.l and spurious
stock beyond

that which they arc authorized by the charter to

issue, they are liable to any purchaser or subsequent transferee of the certificates of obligations vho takes them relying o

their a7;r arent validity.

But a director is not

liable for a breach of trust or act ultra vires or improvident
act committed by his ce-directors, 1;here he was not present
when it

was de~ided won, took no part in it, and had no

knowledge of it,
vented it
11)

by

unless it

a_-,ars that he

igt

have pre-

ordinary attention to 'is duties. (71 Pa.St.,

So also where a director was present e

during only a

pi-rt of the sessicn at w.ich an illegal act was approved and
had no knowledge of the facts.

But if he was -resent when

the act was decided upon, whereby te funds of the corporation
were wasted and did not eprose it, he will.liable.

